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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the facts of a modern day identity theft case. If John Jones, a 
citizen of Ohio, pretends to be Samantha Smith, a New York citizen, and
orders electronic equipment off the internet from a Texas seller, should
Smith be able to sue Jones in New York when her credit card is billed for 
the sale? In 1984, in Calder v. Jones,1 the Supreme Court held that
defendants engaging in intentional tortious conduct out-of-state, calculated to
cause injury to a plaintiff in-state, were subject to jurisdiction in the state
in which the effects of their intentional conduct were felt.2  However, under 
the gloss of the majority of Circuit Courts of Appeals3 and the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Walden v. Fiore,4 absent additional facts, 
Samantha probably would have to travel to Ohio to bring suit against 
John. 
Not until relatively recently has Calder become a major focus of personal 
jurisdiction analysis.5  With the advent of the Internet and the explosion
of new technology, individuals are accused of causing injury in distant 
states in which they have had no direct contacts on a daily basis. 
Trademark, copyright and defamation cases are regularly brought where 
the defendant’s primary contacts with the forum are internet related.6 
1. 	  465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
2. 	Id. at 789–90. 
3. 	See infra notes 54–61. 
4. 	  134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
5. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra B. Robertson, Toward a New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 227 (2014) (“The 
number of effects-test cases has more than tripled in the last decade and there are roughly
twice as many effects-test cases as there are stream-of-commerce cases now”).
6. See, e.g., Schrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. 
Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); Mor-
Dall Enters. Inc., v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-915, 2014 WL 1463906
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 2014); Telemedicine Solutions LLC v. WoundRight Techs., LLC, 
No.13-CV-3431, 2014 WL 1020936 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014); High Tech Pet Prods., Inc. 
v. Shenzhen Jianfeng Electronic Pet Prod. Co., No. 1:13-CV-00242, AWI MJS., 2014 WL 
897002 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); GoFit LLC v. GoFit LLC, No. 12-CV-622-JED-FHM,
2013 WL 1566908 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2013); Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, 961 F. Supp. 
2d 329 (D. Mass. 2013); Parlant Tech. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City School District of N.Y., 
No. 2:12-CV-417-BCW, 2013 WL 1438726 (D. Utah Apr. 9, 2013); 808 Holdings LLC
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[VOL. 52:  357, 2015] From Calder to Walden and Beyond
Lower courts have generally interpreted the Calder’s “effects test” to 
impose three requirements in intentional tort cases: (1) the defendant must
have committed an intentional act, (2) the act must have been expressly
aimed at the forum state, and (3) the defendant must have known that the 
harm—some say the brunt of the harm—to the plaintiff would be suffered
in the forum state.7  Unfortunately, these requirements have not been
interpreted consistently.8  The greatest disagreement concerns the second
requirement. Many courts, fearing the reach of Calder, interpreted the 
second requirement restrictively.  For such courts, it is not enough that the 
defendant knows its intentional conduct will affect a forum resident. 
Rather, the defendant’s conduct must  target the forum itself.9  By contrast, 
other courts have found intentional conduct knowingly targeting a forum
resident to be “expressly aimed at the forum state.”10  To complicate
matters, not only are there differing tests among the circuit courts, there are
differing tests within the same circuit.11 
v. Collective of January 3, 2012 Sharing Hash, No. CV 12-2078-CAS, 2013 WL 1390384
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013); Minelab Americas, Inc. v. UKR Trade, Inc., No. 212-CV-00827­
GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 1314991 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2013). 
7. See, e.g., Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 673 (9th 
Cir. 2012); LaSala v. Marfin Popular Bank Pub. Co., 410 Fed. App’x 474, 477 (3d Cir.
2011); Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex, 
P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 444–45 (7th Cir. 2010); Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796; Stroman Realty, 
Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 485–86 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 816 (2008);
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1072 (10th Cir. 2008);
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262–63 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 
U.S. 1035 (2003). 
8. See infra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Wolstenholme v. Bartels, 511 Fed. App’x 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., 490 Fed. App’x 86, 97 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 941 (2013); Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC, 623 F.3d at 445–46; Clemens 
v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010); Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796; Young, 315 
F.3d at 262–63. 
10. See, e.g., Wash. Shoe Co., 704 F.3d at 675; Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 
1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008); N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir.
2005).
11. See, e.g., Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 565–66 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 1493 (2013), rev’d, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Tamburo v. 
Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2010); Daniels Agrosciences, LLC v. Ball DPF,
LLC, No. CA 13-268 ML., 2013 WL 5310208, at *9–10 (D.R.I. Sept. 20, 2013); compare
Grynberg, 490 Fed. App’x at 97 (“Although ‘[s]ome courts have held that the “expressly
aimed” portion of Calder is satisfied when the defendant “individually target[s] a known 
forum resident,”. . . “we have taken a somewhat more restrictive approach, holding that 
the forum state itself must be the ‘focal point of  the tort.”‘ (citations omitted)), with
Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he individual defendants
 359
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fiore v. Walden,12 ostensibly
to decide the proper interpretation of the second requirement of Calder’s
three-part test.  Although the Court’s opinion seemed to adopt the restrictive
interpretation of the “target forum” requirement, the Court’s limitations 
on the scope of its opinion and the fact that jurisdiction was lacking in 
Walden under any test constrains the precedential value of the case.13 
However, the purpose of this Article is not to critique Walden. Rather, it 
is to fill the void left by Walden and lower courts by providing and 
justifying a comprehensive approach to applying Calder—an approach
under which Samantha would be able to sue John in New York as fairness 
seems to dictate.  This Article argues that the critical element of Calder’s
three-part test is the finding of intentional conduct.  It should not be enough 
that the defendant intended to engage in the conduct that is later found to
be tortious.14 Rather, the defendant’s intentional conduct must have been 
willfully wrongful.  This should require some element of bad faith on the 
part of the defendant. Where willful misconduct affects a known resident 
of the forum, the defendant can reasonably foresee being haled into the 
forum and jurisdiction would not be unfair.  The defendant should therefore
be found to have expressly aimed its conduct at the forum. On the other 
hand, where conduct is not willful, the narrower targeting the forum test
should apply, not as an application of Calder, but as an application of
traditional jurisdictional analysis requiring purposeful availment. On a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, willfulness should 
be decided under a preliminary injunction type standard. That is, the court
should require plaintiff to show that she has a likelihood of success in
proving willfulness.  If that standard is met, the court should uphold personal 
jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home state as long as the defendant has 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s primary residence and plaintiff is proximately
harmed in that state.
Part II of this Article discusses basic personal jurisdiction principles.
Part III describes the Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones.15  Part IV 
addresses lower court decisions interpreting Calder, highlighting the 
conflicts among and within Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning Calder’s 
“targeting the forum” requirement.  Part V reviews Walden v. Fiore and 
explains why the case should have limited significance.  Part VI presents 
the recommended approach to applying Calder’s “effects test” and explains 
do not contest that they knew Mahalo USA operated exclusively in Oklahoma, making
Oklahoma the focal point of any tort against Mahalo USA they may have committed.”).
12.  688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1493 (2013). 
13. See infra notes 143–72 and accompanying text. 
14. Wash. Shoe Co., 704 F.3d at 674. 
15.  465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
360
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
why a defendant who acts in bad faith, with knowledge of the plaintiff’s 
residence, should be considered to have targeted the plaintiff’s home state.
This part also discusses the proper standard of review of motions to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in Calder-based cases. Bad faith
or willfulness should not be based solely on allegations in the pleading. 
Rather, the plaintiff should be required to demonstrate “a likelihood of 
success” in proving that the defendant’s conduct was willful or in bad 
faith.  Part VI concludes by briefly addressing the remaining requirements of
Calder’s “effects test,” explaining why the test should only justify
jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home state when the defendant has knowledge 
of the plaintiff’s primary residence and plaintiff is proximately harmed in 
that state.
II. BASIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION PRINCIPLES
For a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, the forum must have a long-arm statute that authorizes
jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the defendant must be constitutional.16 
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction.17  The plaintiff 
generally needs only to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction in the 
absence of a hearing.18  If there is a hearing, and ultimately at trial, the
plaintiff must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.19 
16. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014); Omni Capital Int’l., Ltd. 
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987); Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 711 
(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Int’l Techs. Consultants v. Euroglas S.A., 107 F.3d 386, 391 (6th 
Cir. 1997)); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2012). 
17. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
708 (1982); In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 529 
(5th Cir. 2014); Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys. v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d
796, 799 (7th Cir. 2014). 
18. See Conn, 667 F.3d at 711; Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy, 490 Fed. App’x 86, 
90 (10th Cir. 2012); Wash. Shoe Co., 704 F.3d at 671–72; Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, 
Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009); Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l., Inc., 
503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007); Cent. Va. Aviation, Inc. v. N. Am. Flight Servs., Inc., 
No. 3:14CV265-HEH, 2014 WL 2002247, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2014). 
19. In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d at 549–50; 
Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 799 (citing Purdue Research Found. 
v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003)); Conn, 667 F.3d at 711; 
LaSala v. Marfin Popular Bank Pub. Co., 410 Fed. App’x 474, 476 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992)); Mwani v. Bin 
Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Cent. Va. Aviation, Inc., 2014 WL 2002247, at 
*2 n.2 (citing Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59–60 (4th Cir. 1993)); Conway
 361






   
  






   









   
 
   










The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment20 sets the
constitutional limits of a sovereign’s judicial power over a defendant.21  A
court has lawful authority to adjudicate only when the defendant has 
minimum contacts with the sovereign “such that the maintenance of suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”22 As 
a general matter, “minimum contacts” requires that the defendant
“purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State.”23  The “purposeful availment” requirement provides “a 
degree of predictability to the legal system” and is designed to allow
potential defendants to structure their relationships to avoid the hardships 
of suit in an inconvenient forum.24  It follows that “random, fortuitous, or
attenuated contacts” with the forum state do not support jurisdiction.25 
To assist in its analysis of adjudicatory authority, the Supreme Court 
has distinguished between two types of jurisdiction: general jurisdiction 
and specific jurisdiction.26  General jurisdiction is based upon continuous and 
systematic contacts with a state that are so substantial as to justify suit on any 
claim, whether or not related to the defendant’s forum activities.27  For an 
individual, general jurisdiction can be based on the individual’s citizenship 
or domicile or presence in the state when served.28 For a corporation, 
general jurisdiction is satisfied when the corporation can fairly be regarded
as “at home” in the forum.29  A corporation’s place of incorporation and 
principal place of business are paradigm bases for the exercise of general
jurisdiction.30 
Steel Fabrication, Inc., v. Stabridg Constr. Co., No. 4:12-CV-00616-KGB, 2013 WL
1947601, at *2 (E.D. Ark., May 10, 2013); Bixby v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-632-PK, 
2013 WL 1789792, at *6 (D. Or. Apr. 26, 2013). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 
(2011).
22. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
23. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
24. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(“When a corporation ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State,’ it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to
alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected 
costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.” 
(citation omitted)).
25. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1983); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980)). 
26. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2853. 
27. See id.
 28. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011). 
29. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
30. Id. at 2854. 
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Specific jurisdiction permits a forum to exercise adjudicatory authority
over a defendant solely with respect to actions that “arise out of or are
connected to activities within the forum state.”31  Traditionally, specific
jurisdiction requires: (1) the defendant to have purposefully availed itself 
of the benefits and privileges of conducting activities in the forum, and
(2) that the cause of action arose from or is related to the defendant’s 
forum activities.32  If both requirements are met, the defendant may still
object that jurisdiction would violate its Due Process rights if it meets the
burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable.33 
To determine fairness and reasonableness, a court considers 
the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining relief.  It must also weigh in its determination ‘the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies.’34 
Where a defendant has committed an intentional tort, the Court has 
modified its minimum contacts analysis, and in such cases, traditional
notions of purposeful availment are not required.35  The leading case 
discussing adjudicatory authority in the case of intentional torts is Calder v.
Jones.36
 31. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (quoting Int’l. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
32. See id. at 2787–88. 
33. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985). 
34. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 113 
(1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 292 (1980)).
35. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd, 131 S. Ct. at 2787; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984); Cassandra B. Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal
Jurisdiction, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1309 (2012). In the Eighth Circuit, the effects 
test does not substitute for or prove purposeful availment, but is just an additional factor 
to consider under the five part test for minimum contacts established by that Circuit in
Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965). See Johnson v. Arden, 
614 F.3d 785, 797 (8th Cir. 2010).  The Eighth Circuit factors are “(1) the nature and 
quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of the contacts; (3) the
relationship of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of [the state] in providing 
a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience or inconvenience to the parties.”  Id. at
794. 
36. See 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 363
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III. CALDER V. JONES
In Calder, Shirley Jones, best known for playing the mom in the
Partridge Family,37 sued the National Enquirer, for libel, invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress38 following an
article portraying her as frequently drunk during taping.39  In addition to
naming the Enquirer in her California suit, she named, in their individual 
capacities, the reporter and editor responsible for the article.40 The 
Enquirer, which had its biggest circulation in California, did not object to
jurisdiction in the California court.41  However, the reporter, South, and
the editor, Calder, both claimed that jurisdiction in California would 
violate their Due Process rights.42  The Supreme Court recognized that 
South and Calder had limited contacts with California43 and could not be 
charged with their employer’s activity in the state.44  Nonetheless, the
Court held jurisdiction over both “proper because of their intentional
conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to respondent [Ms. Jones] in 
California.”45 
Despite this simple formulation of its holding, lower courts have focused 
on earlier language in the Court’s opinion to define the effects test from 
Calder.46  The Court noted that the story concerned the California activities
of a California resident.47 California was therefore “the focal point both 
of the story and of the harm suffered.”48  In response to the arguments of 
petitioners South and Calder that they should no more be subject to suit in 
California than a welder employed in Florida who works on a boiler that
subsequently explodes in California, the Court stated “petitioners are not
charged with mere untargeted negligence, but rather their intentional, and
allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at CaliforniaFalseAnd they
 37. Shirley Jones Biography, BIO.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/shirley­
jones-9542159 [http://perma.cc/CGK6-2ACM] (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
38. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785. 
39. Aljean Harmetz, National Enquirer Agrees To Settle with Shirley Jones in Libel 
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1984, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/27/ 
us/national-enquirer-agrees-to-settle-with-shirley-jones-in-libel-suit.html [http://perma.cc/
24YL-NEKN].  The article claimed that Ms. Jones was driven to drink by her husband’s
maniacal behavior.  Her husband, Marty Ingalls, joined as a plaintiff in the suit against the 
National Enquirer and its employees. Id.
 40. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785–86. 
41. Id. at 785. 
42. Id. at 784–86. 
43. Id. at 785–86. 
44. Id. at 790. 
45. Id. at 791. 
46. Id. at 789–90. 
47. Id. at 788. 
48. Id. at 789. 
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knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the state 
in which she lives and works. . .”49 
IV. APPLICATION OF CALDER IN THE LOWER COURTS
As indicated earlier, lower courts have derived from the above language
some variation of a three-part effects test for personal jurisdiction in
intentional tort cases: (1) the defendant must have committed an 
intentional act; (2) the act must have been expressly aimed at the forum 
state; and (3) the defendant must have known that the harm—some say
the brunt of the harm—to the plaintiff would be suffered in the forum 
state.50  The courts’ interpretations of the first and third requirements are 
rarely dispositive,51 and are therefore not a focus of this section.  Although 
the interpretation of the critical second requirement has been riddled with 
49. Id. at 789–90. 
50. See supra note 7. 
51. See N.C.C. Motorsports, Inc. v. K-VA-T Food Stores, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d. 
993, 1003–04 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (citing Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 394 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2010)) (explaining surveyed state and federal cases).  Given that Calder’s
three-part test “applies only to intentional torts,” the first requirement is largely redundant. 
Holland Am. Line, Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007). See 
also Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Calder speaks directly to
personal jurisdiction in intentional-tort cases; the principles articulated there can be
applied to cases involving tortious conduct committed over the Internet.”); Oldfield v. 
Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1220 n.28 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding the 
same); Cognigen Networks, Inc. v. Cognigen Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (same).  Whether the court requires intentional and allegedly tortious or 
wrongful acts, see Marten v. Goodwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297 (3d. Cir. 2007); Tamburo, supra, 
at 703, or merely “an intent to perform an actual physical act in the real world,” see
Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012); Pan-
Am Prods. & Holdings, LLC. v. R.T.G. Furniture Corp., 825 F. Supp. 2d 664, 684 (M.D.
N.C. 2011) (explaining a plaintiff’s allegations of an intentional tort should satisfy either
standard). See, e.g., Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., 490 Fed. App’x 86, 96 (10th Cir. 
2012); Tamburo, supra at 703.  The interpretative differences with respect to the third
requirement, whether the plaintiff must show harm, see Washington Shoe Co., supra, at 673; 
Tamburo, supra, at 703, or “the brunt of the injury,” see Grynberg, supra, at 96; Johnson
v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796–97 (8th Cir. 2010), was known to be felt in the forum state, also
do not typically form the sole basis for decision.  The third requirement, however, is sometimes
factually dispositive where the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant knew where the 
plaintiff resided and therefore could not know that the harm would be felt in the forum 
state. See, e.g., Tamburo, supra, at 708; Harp v. Koury, No. 13-2470, 2013 WL 3153780, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2013); Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 8 (Cal. 2002). 
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inconsistencies both among52 and within individual circuits,53 two primary 
tests have emerged.  The First,54 Third,55 Fourth,56 Fifth,57 Sixth,58 Seventh,59 
Eighth,60 and Tenth Circuit61 Courts of Appeals all require that the defendant 
target the forum state, not merely a forum resident, which is the restrictive
view. By contrast, the Ninth62 and Eleventh Circuit63 Courts of Appeals and
some district courts in the Second Circuit64 simply require that the defendant 
target a plaintiff known to reside in the forum state, which is the broad
view.  Strangely, the lower court decisions are devoid of reasoning justifying 
adoption of either view, other than citations to parts of the Calder opinion.
The difference between the two views can be demonstrated by comparing 
two defamation cases and two intellectual property cases, areas in which 
the parties frequently cite Calder to support their personal jurisdiction
arguments.65
 52. See infra notes 54–64.
 53. See supra note 11. 
54. See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir. 2001); 
Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 1998). 
55. See LaSala v. Martin Popular Bank Pub. Co., Ltd., 410 Fed. App’x 474, 477
(3d. Cir. 2011). 
56. See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262–63 (4th Cir. 2002); Imo
Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998). 
57. See Herman v. Cataphora, Inc., 730 F.3d 460, 465–66 (5th Cir. 2013); Clemens v.
McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011); 
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002). 
58. See Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v.  Safetech Int’l., Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 55 –53
(6th Cir. 2007); Reynolds v. Int’l. Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1120 (6th Cir.
1994).
59. Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex,
P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2010). 
60. See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); Wood v. Kapustin, 
992 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (D. Minn. 2014). 
61. See Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy, Inc., 490 Fed. App’x 86, 97–98 (10th Cir.
2012); Schrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 2011); Dudnikov v. 
Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1074–75 (10th Cir. 2008). 
62. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 744 
(9th Cir. 2013); Wash. Shoe Co. v A-Z Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 
2012); Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 577 (9th Cir. 2012). 
63. See Brennan v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse N.Y., Inc., 322 Fed. App’x
852, 855–66 (11th Cir. 2009); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 
2008).
64. See Carrabba v. Morgat, No. 2:12-CV-6342(KM), 2014 WL 229280, at *8–9
(D. N.J. Jan. 17, 2014); Jenkins v. Miller, 983 F. Supp. 2d 423, 442–43 (D. Vt. 2013); Audsley
v. RBS Citizens, N.A., No. 5:10-CV-208, 2011 WL 1397312, at *4, n.1 (D. Vt. Apr. 11, 
2011); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Redican, 309 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317–18 (D. Conn. 
2004); Simon v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
65. See Cassandra Robertson, supra note 35, at 1348 (citing Jeffrey H. Moon, New 
Wine, Old Wineskins: Emerging Interests in Internet-Based Personal Jurisdiction, 42 
CATH. LAW. 67, 67 (2002)). 
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The restrictive view in the defamation area is exemplified by Johnson 
v. Arden.66 In Johnson the plaintiffs, cat breeders, sued a number of 
defendants, including Kathleen Heineman, for defamation.67  The plaintiffs
alleged that Heineman stated on ComplaintBoards.com that the plaintiffs 
“killed cats, sold infected kittens, brutally killed and tortured unwanted 
cats and operated a ‘kitten mill’ in Unionville, Missouri.”68 Heineman, a
resident of Colorado, had a limited business relationship with the plaintiffs.69 
Although not a salaried employee, Heineman provided administrative 
services for the plaintiffs from her Colorado office.70  Heineman also
purchased advertising space from the plaintiffs for a fee of one hundred 
dollars per kitten advertised.71  The plaintiffs, in turn, shipped a number
of cats to Heineman, charging her only out of pocket expenses.72  The court,
accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true, found that the statements posted
were aimed at the plaintiffs, Missouri residents, and assumed the effects
of the statements were felt in Missouri.73 Nonetheless, the court concluded 
that Missouri lacked personal jurisdiction over Ms. Heineman because
there was “no evidence that the www.ComplaintsBoard.com website
specifically targets Missouri, or that the content of Heineman’s alleged
postings specifically targeted Missouri.”74 
66.  614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010). 
67. Id. at 788. 
68. Id. at 796. 
69. Id. at 788. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 789. 
72. Id. at 788–89. 
73. Id at 796. 
74. Id. Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010), is to similar effect. 
In Clemens, the plaintiff, famous pitcher Roger Clemens, a Texas resident, sued his former
trainer Brian McNamee for statements made to former Senator George Mitchell as part of 
baseball’s investigation into performance enhancing drugs and later to a senior writer for
the internet site, SI.com.  Id. at 377.  McNamee’s claims that Clemens used performance 
enhancing drugs were published by every national news service and every major
newspaper in Texas, as well as on the Sports Illustrated internet site.  Id.  As in Johnson, 
Clemens involved a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
allegedly defamatory comments targeting a known forum resident, and injury in the forum 
state. Id.  Moreover, in Clemens, the defendant had made several trips to the forum in the
past and there was no doubt that many forum residents read the defendant’s allegations about 
Clemens. Id.  Still, the court found that Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  Id. at 380. The court stated that Texas was not the focal point of the 
defendant’s comments: “the statements did not concern activity in Texas; nor were they
made in Texas or directed to Texas residents any more than residents of any state.”  Id.  
See also, Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 264 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
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Contrast that with the broad view adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Gordy
v. Daily News.75  In Gordy, the plaintiff, the renowned founder of Motown 
Records and a twenty-four year resident of California, sued The Daily
News and reporter George Rush, a New York resident, for defamation.76 
Rush’s offending article discussed a book written by a Florida resident
about Gordy’s Motown activities.77  The primary source of the article was 
the Florida author,78 the events described did not occur in California, and 
the article did not mention California.79  Although the Daily News sold
thirteen copies of its’ daily edition and eighteen copies of its’ Sunday 
edition in California,80 the benefits from those sales could not be attributed
to the defendant Rush.81  Thus, the Daily News, much less reporter Rush, 
did not specifically target a California audience and the alleged libelous 
article did not focus on California events.82 Nonetheless, the court found 
jurisdiction proper because the Daily News and Rush published and wrote 
their allegedly defamatory column intentionally directing it at a known
California resident.83 
The restrictive view in the intellectual property area is illustrated by
Wood v. Kapustin,84 a case involving intellectual property claims in addition 
to allegations of defamation.85  Wood, a Minnesota attorney, had earlier 
represented clients who claimed that they paid the Kasputin defendants 
for a car that was never delivered.86  Wood sent a demand letter and 
thereafter negotiated for delivery of the vehicle or a refund of the purchase
price.87  After the clients learned of other people who shared similar 
Defendant did not have the manifest intent of targeting the forum state, and therefore did 
not have sufficient contacts with the forum state to allow the district court to exercise
jurisdiction).
75.  95 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 1996). 
76. Id. at 831.  The challenged statements were sufficiently offensive that the court
chose not to republish them, but noted that they were of a nature “that clearly would have
a severe impact on Gordy as an individual.” Id. at 833. 
77. See Appellate Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 2, 6, Gordy v. Daily News, 95 
F.3d 829 (No. 95-55102), 1995 WL 17017311 at *2, *6. 
78. Id. at 6. 
79. See Gordy, 95 F.3d at 831.  Presumably, the events occurred in Michigan, where
Motown Records was located. The Story of Motown Records, CLASSIC MOTOWN, 
http://classic.motown.com/history/ [http://perma.cc/WVS2-BAQU] (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
80. See Gordy, 95 F.3d at 831.  The California sales represented approximately
.0017% of the Daily News’ total circulation.  Id.
 81. Id. at 832 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)). 
82. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
83. See Gordy, 95 F.3d at 833. 
84. See Wood v. Kapustin, 992 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946 (D. Minn. 2014) (quoting Johnson
v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010)).
85. See id. at 944. 
86. Id. at 943. 
87. Id. 
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negative experiences at the hands of the defendants, Wood registered a 
website, KasputinCars.com to hear from all those who had problems with 
the defendants.88  To retaliate, the defendants registered the domain names 
NadiaWoodBlackmailer.com and NadiaWoodLaw.com, both of which
redirected users to NadiaWood.net, an anonymously registered domain.89 
That site displayed Wood’s logo and Minnesota address and included the 
header “InvestigateNadiaWood@gmail.com” under which was the suggestion 
that Ms. Wood was a blackmailer.90 Wood then brought suit for, among
other things, copyright, trade dress and service mark infringement,
violations of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, and 
defamation.91 The court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction 
even though defendants’ websites: (1) were accessible in Minnesota; (2)
used the plaintiff’s trademark protected service mark; (3) contained links 
to the plaintiff’s copyrighted logo; and (4) were created to harm the reputation 
of Wood, a known Minnesota attorney, whose client base ostensibly was
from Minnesota.92  The court concluded that the website could not create 
personal jurisdiction by itself because it was a passive website and jurisdiction 
was not proper under Calder because the plaintiff’s allegations were
insufficient to demonstrate that the defendants’ conduct was “uniquely
or expressly” aimed at Minnesota.93 
Wood contrasts sharply with the broad view applied in Boyd Gaming 
Corp. v. B Hotel Group, LLC.94  In Boyd Gaming Corp., the plaintiff, a 
Nevada corporation, owned twenty-two casinos throughout the United 
States.95  Boyd advertised its services with trademark terms including “B
CONNECTED, B RELAXED, B ENTERTAINED, B REWARDED, B
SATISFIED and B RECOGNIZED.”96  Despite notice of the plaintiff’s
marks, the defendant, a Florida casino, began marketing its goods and 
services with terms such as “B HAPPY, B OUR GUEST, B IN TOWN,
B IN THE CITY, and B ON THE BEACH.”97  The plaintiff filed suit in
 88. Id.
 89. Id. at 944. 
90. Id.
 91. Id. 
92. Id. at 944. 
93. Id.
 94. See No. 2:13-CV-00981(GMN), 2014 WL 643790 (D. Nev. Feb. 18, 2014). 
95. Complaint at 2, Boyd Gaming Corp. v. B Hotel Group, LLC, No. 2:13-CV­
00981-GMN, 2014 WL 643790 (D. Nev. 2014) (No. 2:13CV00981), 2013 WL 2728423. 
96. Id. at 4–6. 
97. Id. at 10–13. 
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its home state of Nevada alleging that the defendant willfully infringed its 
“B family” of marks.98  The defendant had no physical presence of any
kind and did not solicit business in Nevada.99  Although the defendant had a
website that was accessible to Nevada residents, it in no way targeted
them.100 Nonetheless, the court found that the defendant was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Nevada courts, holding that acts of willful infringement
are expressly aimed at the forum when the defendant knows the trademark
holder is a resident of that forum.101 
In short, the restrictive view demands that the defendants target the 
specific forum, not a multitude of states, and generally focuses on the
defendants’ audience or the location of events to determine whether that
requirement is met.  The broad view simply requires that the defendants
target a known forum resident and focuses on the ultimate effects of the
defendants’ conduct.
V. WALDEN V. FIORE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
In Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify 
the proper approach for applying Calder’s “effects test,” but chose to issue
a narrow opinion that fails to provide a framework for analysis under
Calder.102 
A. The Facts 
In Walden, professional gamblers Gina Fiore and Keith Gibson, the
plaintiffs, were traveling from Puerto Rico to Las Vegas with a connecting 
stop in Atlanta, Georgia.103  The defendant, Anthony Walden, serving as
a deputized agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
together with another DEA agent, conducted an investigative stop at the 
Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson Airport.104  In response to the defendant’s
questioning, the plaintiffs showed the defendant California driver’s licenses 
as identification105 and explained that they were carrying large amounts
of cash because they were professional gamblers.106  The agents then used 
98. Id. at 3. 
99. Boyd, 2014 WL 643790 at *1. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at *3. 
102.  134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
103. Id. at 1119. 
104. Id.  The Atlanta DEA agents had been forewarned by DEA agents in San Juan 
that the plaintiffs were travelling with almost $97,000 in cash. Id.
105. Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 562–63 (9th Cir. 2012) (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
106. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119. 
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a trained dog to perform a drug-sniff test and, after allegedly inconclusive 
results, seized the plaintiffs’ cash on suspicion that the cash was involved
in drug transactions.107  The defendant advised the plaintiffs that their funds
would be returned if they later proved a legitimate source for the cash.108 
The plaintiffs returned to Las Vegas and through their attorney provided 
documentation to establish the legitimacy of their funds.109  Meanwhile,
the defendant turned the money seized over to the DEA and allegedly filed 
a false and misleading affidavit, designed to support probable cause for 
the seizure, to the United States Attorney’s Office in Virginia.110 
Ultimately, the U.S. Attorney in charge of the case concluded that the 
government lacked probable cause for the seizure and the DEA returned 
the money to the plaintiff’s approximately seven months after the seizure.111 
The plaintiffs maintained residences in both California and Las Vegas.112 
The flight they boarded in Atlanta was destined for Las Vegas and the
communications between their attorney and the defendant originated from 
Las Vegas.113 However, the identification provided by the plaintiffs 
indicated a California address. The defendant, on the other hand, “never 
traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent
anything or anyone to Nevada.”114 
B. The Lower Court Litigation 
The plaintiffs filed a Bivens115 action in the United States District Court 
for the District of Nevada alleging that Walden and others violated their 
Fourth Amendment rights by, inter alia, improperly seizing their funds 
107. Id., n.1.  The defendant’s statement of the case asserted that the dog pawed at 
Gibson’s bag. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) 
(No.12-574), 2013 WL 2390244 at *3. 
108. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1119–20.  The alleged misleading affidavit was not part of the record. Id.
at 1119, n.2.  In a phone call between the author’s research assistant, Katherine Beres, and 
Robert A. Nersesian, the plaintiffs’ attorney admitted that he had never seen the affidavit
alleged to be misleading.  Telephone Interview by Katherine Beres with Robert A.
Nersesian (May 29, 2014). 
111. Id. at 1119-20. 
112. Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 2012) (McKeown, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc).
113. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119. 
114. Id. at 1124. 
115. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens
authorizes constitutional tort claims against individual government officials. Id. at 389. 
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and filing a false and misleading affidavit that led to the continued 
withholding of those funds.116  Walden responded by filing a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue.117  The district court 
granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.118  The court analyzed
personal jurisdiction using Calder’s effects test and concluded that 
because all of Walden’s acts took place in Georgia, Walden did not
expressly aim his acts at Nevada.119 
On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded.120  The court assumed that the district court was 
correct that the seizure of funds in Georgia alone could not support a 
finding of personal jurisdiction in Nevada. However, the court faulted the
district court for failing to consider the probable cause affidavit “aspect of
the case.”121  The court found that the defendant expressly targeted
Nevada because he filed the allegedly false affidavit with the purpose of 
having its consequences felt by parties with a “significant connection” to 
Nevada.122  The court specifically stated that for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction, it did not matter whether the plaintiffs were legal residents of
Nevada.123 The defendant’s knowledge that the plaintiffs’ had significant
connections with the forum and intent to have the consequences of his
actions felt in the forum was sufficient under Calder to establish 
purposeful direction.124  The court then found that the cause of action
would not have arisen “but for” Walden’s allegedly false probable cause
affidavit125 and the defendant did not prove that jurisdiction in Nevada would
be unreasonable.126  After finding jurisdiction over the false affidavit
claim, the court remanded the case for the district court to exercise its
 116. Fiore, 688 F.3d at 572. 
117. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1120.  This Article focuses on personal jurisdiction and 
will not discuss the venue issues.  The Supreme Court also did not address the motion to 
dismiss for lack of venue, finding that the case could be dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds. Id. at 1121 n.5.
118.  Fiore v. Walden, No. 2:07-CV-01674-ECR, 2008 WL 9833854, at *5 (D. Nev. 
Oct. 17, 2008), rev’d, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 
1115 (2014).
119. Id. at *3–4.  The court also stated, that “Walden’s intentional acts committed in
Georgia eventually caused harm to Plaintiffs in Nevada, and Walden may have known that
Plaintiffs lived in Nevada” was insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id. at *3. 
120. Fiore, 688 F.3d at 588. 
121. Id. at 577. 
122. Id. at 579. 
123. Id.
 124. Id. at 580. 
125. Id. at 582. 
126. Id. at 585.  The court found that when federal employees are sued under Bivens, “the 
government, as a rule, provides for their defense, and ultimately indemnifies them.” Id. at
584. 
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discretion with regard to whether the search and seizure claim, which
arose out of a common nucleus of facts, should be heard as pendent to the
false affidavit claim.127 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas,
reversed the Court of Appeals decision.128  According to the Court, “the
Court of Appeals impermissibly allow[ed] a plaintiff’s contacts with the
defendant and the forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis.”129  Because 
the “minimum contacts” inquiry is designed to protect the liberty interests of
the defendant, not the interests of the plaintiff,130 the Court said the proper
focus of the minimum contacts analysis is “the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”131  As such, mere harm to  a  
forum resident was not sufficient to justify jurisdiction in a forum with
which the defendant had no contacts.132 
The Court cited Calder approvingly, but distinguished Calder from the 
case before it.133  In Calder, the forum contacts were ample134 and, most
importantly, the reputation-based injury in California, necessary for the
alleged libel to be actionable, connected the defendants to California, not
just to the plaintiff.135  In contrast, all of Walden’s relevant conduct
occurred in Georgia.136  He seized the cash in Georgia and wrote the
affidavit in Georgia.137  Even if the Court considered the continuation of
the seizure to be a distinct injury, the Court said “it was not tethered to
 127. Id. at 588.  Judge Ikuta dissented, finding “no claim that Walden’s preparation
of the allegedly fraudulent affidavit violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights,” and
doubting “that such a constitutional tort even exists.” Id. at 593.  Eight judges, in two 
separate opinions, dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.  Id. at 562, 568. 
128.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014). 
129. Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. at 1125 n.9. 
131. Id. at 1123, (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (emphasis added)).
132. Id. at 1125. 
133. Id. at 1123, 1125. 
134. “The defendants relied on phone calls to ‘California sources’ for the information in 
their article; they wrote the story about the plaintiff’s activities in California; they caused
reputational injury in California by writing an allegedly libelous article that was widely
circulated in the State; and the ‘brunt’ of that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that 
State.”  Id. at 1123. 
135. Id. at 1123–24. 
136. Id. at 1126. 
137. Id. at 1125 n.9. 
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Nevada in any meaningful way.”138  The funds were not being withheld
in Nevada and the plaintiff’s lack of access to the funds would occur 
anywhere the plaintiff’s chose to be at the time they desired the funds.139 
Furthermore, Walden “never traveled to, conducted activities within,
contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada.”140 That 
Walden’s conduct ultimately affected a person with connections to the 
forum state was not, according to the Court, a jurisdictionally relevant
contact.141  In the absence of any contacts with Nevada, “well-established 
principles” of personal jurisdiction required the lower court to grant the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.142 
D. Limitations on the Scope of the Court’s Decision in Walden
Although the language in Walden appears to favor the restrictive view 
of Calder’s second requirement, and courts preferring that view have 
already cited Walden to support their decisions,143 the scope and 
significance of the Court’s opinion may not be as broad as first appears. 
The opinion does not adopt the restrictive approach, it contains express 
limitations on the scope of the Court’s opinion and emphasizes facts that
lower courts preferring the broad view of Calder can use to distinguish 
Walden.144 
The Court’s decision in Walden neither broke new ground nor explicitly or
implicitly adopted the restrictive view of Calder’s second requirement.145 
The Court unequivocally said, “well-established principles of personal 
jurisdiction are sufficient to decide this case.”146  The opinion also did not 
138. Id. at 1125. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1124. 
141. Id. at 1125. 
142. Id. at 1126. 
143. See, e.g., Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.,
751 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2014); Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)-1, LLC v. Devine, 
Millimet & Branch, 750 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2014); Pelican Communications, Inc. 
v. Schneider, No. C-14-4371-EMC, 2015 WL 527472 at *3 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 6, 2015); 
Enutroff, LLC v. EPIC Emergent Energy, Inc., No. 14-CV-2389-EFM-GLR, 2015 WL
419797 at *7 (D. Kan., Feb. 2, 2015); Bank of America, N.A. v. Corporex Cos., No. 3:13­
CV-691-RJC, 2014 WL 3731778, at *4–5 (W.D.N.C., July 28 2014); Conex Energy-
Canada, LLC v. Mann Engineering, Ltd., No. CIV 13-4123-KES, 2014 WL 3732571, at 
*4–5 (S. S.D., July 25, 2014); Private Capital Group, v. Dareus, No. 2:13-CV-18TS, 2014
WL 3394662, at *4 (D. Utah July 10, 2014). 
144. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12-CV-184, 2014 WL 3530365, at *4–5 (D. 
Vt. July 15, 2014); Edozien v. XS Micro, LLC, No. MICV201305066F, 2014 WL
1260516, at *1–2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2014). 
145. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1126. 
146. Id. at 1126; see also Jenkins, 2014 WL 3530365, at *5 (Walden “left undisturbed 
established Supreme Court precedent . . . .”).
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require a defendant to uniquely target the forum state as generally required
under the restrictive view of Calder.147 Rather, it just required some 
meaningful contact with that state.148  Thus, the Court ostensibly would
find the contacts in a case like Clemens149 sufficient to support jurisdiction, 
despite the contrary ruling under the Eleventh Circuit’s restrictive approach. 
Just as in the Court’s description of Calder, in Clemens, “the reputation-
based ‘effects’ of the alleged libel connected the defendant[ ] to [the forum
state], not just to the plaintiff.”150 
Perhaps the Court did not adopt either standard for applying Calder
because a choice was unnecessary. The result in Walden should have been
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under either approach to Calder’s
second prong.  Even under the broad view, defendants do not target the
forum unless they aim their conduct at a known forum resident.151  There was
no evidence that the defendant in Walden knew that the plaintiffs resided in
Nevada.152  Although the defendant received correspondence from Las
Vegas,153 Walden could have reasonably believed the plaintiffs were in
Las Vegas to gamble.  Indeed, there was cause to believe the plaintiffs
were from California given that the driver’s licenses produced by the
plaintiffs for identification had California addresses.154  Even the Ninth
Circuit could not find that the plaintiffs were residents of Nevada.155  It  
merely found that the plaintiffs were “connected to” Nevada.156
 147. See supra notes 66–74, 84–93 and accompanying text. 
148. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125. 
149. See supra note 74. 
150. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–24. The defendant in Clemens, as did the defendants in
Calder, had ample additional contacts with the forum state. See Clemens v. McNamee, 615 
F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2010). 
151. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
152. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119.
 153. Id.
154. Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 562–63 (9th Cir. 2012) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc).
155. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124.
 156. Id. at 580.  Walden also could have been dismissed under either view because 
it failed Calder’s third requirement. That requirement demands that the “harm” to the
plaintiff be in the forum state. See supra notes 7, 51 and accompanying text.  The harm 
from the seizure occurred in Georgia and the harm from the false affidavit was the
continued withholding of funds in either Georgia or Washington, D.C.  Even if one considered
where the plaintiff was affected, rather than where the harm occurred, the plaintiffs were 
affected by the seizure in Georgia, which is where they were at the time of the seizure. Id. 
at 571.  Although plaintiffs were affected by the false affidavit claim in Las Vegas, where 
they were living at the time the affidavit was filed, the false affidavit claim should not even
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The Court, besides not choosing or needing to break new ground, carefully 
limited its decision to the facts of the case.  Specifically, the Court said its
opinion did not address the very different question of when a defendant’s
virtual presence in a forum, through the internet or other electronic means, 
should translate into “contacts” for purposes of jurisdictional analysis.157 
That limitation is significant given that today most companies have websites 
on the internet.158  One case has already distinguished Walden on this 
basis.159 
Lower courts can also distinguish Walden based upon the language the
Court used to distinguish Calder.  The Court emphasized that publication to
third persons is a necessary element of libel and therefore the intentional 
tort in Calder actually occurred in California where the libel was read.160 
In fact, the Court found, “the crux of Calder was that the reputation-based 
‘effects’ of the alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just
to the plaintiff.”161  Obviously, this language can be used to distinguish
Walden from most defamation and libel cases.162  When an alleged false
statement reaches the plaintiff’s home state, the effect of the libel or 
defamation will connect the defendant to the forum state.  In many of the 
other more common cases raising Calder issues, defendants similarly can 
be connected to the forum state. For example, a necessary element of a 
trademark infringement claim is to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion
between plaintiff’s and defendant’s mark.163  That would connect the
defendant to plaintiff’s home state whenever their mark is accessible to 
have been considered by the courts.  Not only is it unclear whether such a claim exists, see 
Fiore, 688 F.3d at 595 n.6 (Ikuta, J., dissenting), the claim was not sufficiently pled under
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009). The complaint merely alleged on information and belief that the affidavit 
contained misrepresentations and omitted exculpatory facts without indicating the nature
of either. Fiore, 688 F.3d at 591 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). This is not surprising given that 
the plaintiffs had not seen the affidavit. See supra note 110.  It appears that the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to reject all bases for dismissal in Walden was greatly influenced by the 
fact that in Bivens actions, “the government, as a rule, provides for their defense, and 
ultimately indemnifies them.” Fiore, 688 F.3d at 584. 
157. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125 n.9. 
158. See Nat’l Small Bus. Ass’n, 2013 Small Business Technology Survey, NSBA 6 
(Aug. 2013), http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Technology-Survey-2013.
pdf [http://perma.cc/8ESS-MFBD].
159. See Edozien v. XS Micro, LLC, No. MICV201305066F, 2014 WL 1260516, at 
*1–2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2014). 
160. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124; see also GT Securities, Inc. v. Klestech GmbH, No.
C-13-03090 JCS, 2014 WL 2928013, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (finding injury in
the state was the “key” to Walden).
161. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–24. 
162. See, e.g., Edozien, 2014 WL 1260516, at *1–2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2014). 
163. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. 
v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004). 
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consumers there.164  A number of courts go further and say that the injury
in a trademark action occurs wherever the trademark holder resides.165  That
injury would connect the defendant to the plaintiff’s home state even if the
defendant didn’t use the mark in that state. Similarly, some courts say that 
a copyright injury occurs where the copyright is held.166  Therefore, the 
defendant would be connected to the plaintiff’s home state even if the 
defendant does not publish the copyrighted work in that state.  Moreover, 
many copyright violations occur on the internet so access by anyone in the
plaintiff’s home state would cause the defendant to have republished the
copyrighted work in that state, thus connecting the defendant to that 
state.167  Even in fraud or misrepresentation cases, the misrepresentation 
is often by phone calls to, or access to the internet in the plaintiff’s home
state.168  This too would connect the defendant to the forum state similar
to Calder and contrary to Walden.
Finally, in Walden, the defendant appeared to have no contacts at all 
with Nevada.169  The Court said the defendant “never traveled to, conducted 
activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to” the 
forum state.170 The defendants in many cases invoking Calder have such
contacts with the forum state.171  Whether it is phone calls or mail to, internet
 164. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1354 (11th Cir.
2013).
165. See, e.g., Boyd Gaming Corp. v. B Hotel Group, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-00981­
GMN, 2014 WL 643790, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 18, 2014); Dearborn Tree Serv. Inc. v. Gray’s 
Outdoorservices, LLC, No. 13-CV-12584, 2013 WL 6552837, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 13, 
2013).
166. See Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 678 (9th Cir. 
2012); cf. N.C.C. Motorsports, Inc. v. K-VA-T Food Stores, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d. 993, 
1003 n.6 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (citing cases that “seem to support this proposition,” but finding 
it unnecessary to “decide conclusively” whether the harm from copyright infringement is 
felt in the copyright holder’s forum state). 
167. See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Judge Rules Against Grooveshark in Copyright
Infringement Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
09/30/business/media/judge-rules-against-grooveshark-in-copyright-infringement-case.html?
_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XK7J-UHGN].
168. See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008); Wysnoski v.
Miller, 759 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
169. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124. 
170. Id.
 171. See, e.g., Wolstenholme v. Bartels, 511 Fed. App’x 215 (3d Cir. 2013);
Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy, Inc., 490 Fed. App’x 86 (10th Cir. 2012); LaSala v. Marfin
Popular Bank Pub. Co., 410 Fed. App’x 474 (3d Cir. 2011); Schrader v. Biddinger, 633 
F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2011); Panagea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610 (1st Cir. 2001).
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access from, or a pre-existing relationship with someone residing in the
forum state, those contacts can be used to distinguish Walden and find
jurisdiction under either the broad view of Calder or traditional personal
jurisdiction principles.172 
Thus, explicit and implicit limitations in the Court’s opinion leave lower 
courts free to apply whatever approach to Calder they prefer.  Although 
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Walden, it did not make 
new law or resolve the conflict among the lower courts concerning the proper 
application of Calder.  The following section, recommends a comprehensive 
approach to Calder-based cases to fill the void understandably left by the 
Court’s opinion.
VI. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO CALDER
This Article recommends that Calder be interpreted to require: 
1.	 The defendant must have committed a tortious and willful 
act that targeted the plaintiff; and 
2.	 The defendant knew plaintiff’s primary residence and that 
the plaintiff would be proximately harmed in that state
These requirements will be explained and justified below. The
recommendation is designed to harmonize the two divergent standards in 
the lower courts, provide the optimal result in terms of fairness and efficiency,
and remain substantially consistent with existing law. 
A. Willful Targeting of the Plaintiff
The key component of this Article’s recommended approach to effects 
test cases is the requirement of willful misconduct as part of Calder’s
“intentional act” requirement.173  Where willfulness is present, traditional 
172. See Tresona Multimedia, LLC v. Legg, No. CV-14-02141-PHX-DGC, 2015 
WL 470228 at *4 (D. Ariz., Feb. 4, 2015); Havel v. Honda Motor Europe, Ltd., No. H-13­
1291, 2014 WL 4967229 at *10 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 30, 2014); Defense Training Sys. v. Int’l 
Charter Inc. of Wyo., No. 3:13-CV-172 JWS, 2014 WL 3051217, at *11 (D. Alaska July
3, 2014); Failla v. Futureone Corp., 181 Wash. 2d 642, 653 n.2 (Wash. 2014, en banc). 
173. The Seventh Circuit in uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 435 
(7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2010)), appears 
to have agreed that the intentional act requirement should be interpreted to demand a 
willfully wrongful act.  Also, the Ninth Circuit recently has expressly recognized the
significance of willfulness in an effects test analysis, albeit as part of the targeted the
forum, and not the “intentional act,” requirement of Calder. See Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z 
Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d at 674–75 (9th Cir. 2012); accord D. Brutke’s Victory Hills,
LLC v. Tutera, No. 3:12-CV-019510-SI, 2013 WL 3818146, at (D. Or. July 22, 2013); 
Trade West, Inc. v. Dollar Tree, Inc., No. 12-00606 ACK-BMK, 2013 WL 1856302, at 
(D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2013); Aoki v. Gilbert, No. 2:11-CV-02797-MCE-CKD, 2013 WL
378
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personal jurisdiction principles and sound policy justify jurisdiction over
a defendant who targets and causes proximate harm to a known forum 
resident. Yet, where willfulness is lacking, those same principles and
policy recommend rejection of the broad view of Calder. Under those 
circumstances, Calder should be interpreted as requiring a more specific
targeting of the forum, similar to the restrictive view of Calder. However, 
the higher standard would be the result of traditional personal jurisdiction 
principles requiring purposeful availment rather than Calder’s effects
test.174  It is the presence, not the mere allegation of willfulness that should 
be determinative.  Accordingly, on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be required to prove willfulness under a 
preliminary injunction type standard.  That is, the court should require a 
plaintiff to establish that she has a “likelihood of success” in proving 
willfulness.175 
1. Defining Willfulness 
Willfulness, for the purposes of this Article, follows the definition of 
intent in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.  That is, a person acts willfully
when: “(a) the person acts with the purpose of producing [resulting]
consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the producing or before 
1324267 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013) (all quoting Wash. Shoe Co.).  Courts in other circuits 
have not similarly expressly required a showing of willfulness.  Nonetheless, the presence
or absence of willfulness appears to affect the outcome in some effects test cases that do
not expressly require willfulness. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151
(9th Cir. 2006) (finding where there was no basis for finding willfulness, the Ninth Circuit, 
which follows the broad view and had not yet recognized the importance of a willfulness 
determination, found jurisdiction was improper even though the plaintiff sued in its home
state for trademark injuries allegedly occurring there); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Chi. Bancorp.,
Inc., No. 4:12CV246 CDP, 2014 WL 1315563, at (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2014), vacated, 2014 
WL 4415261 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2014).  The Eighth Circuit, which follows the restrictive
view, found jurisdiction was proper where there was an apparent willful fraudulent transfer, 
despite that the transfer occurred and involved funds which were out of state. This Article’s 
recommendation only would make explicit what such courts, without any reasoning, seem 
to do implicitly.
174. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
plurality); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 
112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 
(1984).
175. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987); 
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975). 
 379
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resulting consequence is substantially certain to result.”176  This definition 
incorporates bad faith conduct and conduct taken with “reckless disregard” of 
their consequences.177 Willfulness, however, generally requires more than 
violating a statute or common law obligation.  For example, in a trademark
infringement claim willfulness would require not merely that there was a 
likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s mark,178 but 
either that the defendant purposefully created confusion or any reasonable
person would have known there would be likely confusion.179  A good faith 
argument that the challenged mark was not infringing should negate a 
finding of willfulness.180 That would be true even if the defendant knew of
the plaintiff’s mark and received a cease and desist letter from the plaintiff’s
attorney.181 Knowledge that the plaintiff’s attorney thinks or asserts a mark 
is infringing does not establish that any reasonable person would know
the mark was infringing. The paradigm case of willful trademark infringement
would be selling counterfeit goods.182  Willfulness could also be established 
in the trademark context when the defendant is selling competing goods
in the same geographic market as the plaintiff and has adopted a mark
virtually identical to that of the plaintiff.183 In cases such as Calder, where
libel or defamation is alleged by a public figure—actual malice, which includes
a reckless disregard as to the veracity of the challenged statement—is a 
necessary element of the claim.184 Therefore, substantive liability for such
claims simultaneously satisfies the requirement of willfulness. 
Although this definition of willful depends upon the defendant’s subjective 
intent or knowledge, those subjective elements can be proven with objective
factors to avoid “the epistemological and practical proof objections raised
by subjective standards.”185
 176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2010). 
177. See Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 
2012).
178. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
179. See, e.g., SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 187
(3d Cir. 2000); Thomsen v. United States, 887 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1989). 
180. See SecuraComm Consulting, Inc., 166 F.3d at 189. 
181. Id.
 182. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2012). 
183. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Artex Creative Int’l. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 
2d 347, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
184. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).  In the defamation
and libel context, an author is guilty of reckless disregard when he “‘in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,’ or acted with a ‘high degree of awareness 
of . . . probable falsity.’” See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 
(1991) (citations omitted). 
185. Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L. J. 189, 219–20 (1998). 
380
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2. Support for the Broad View of Calder’s “Targeting Forum” 
Requirement Where There Is Willfulness 
If a plaintiff can prove that the defendant’s tortious conduct was willful,
traditional personal jurisdiction principles186 warrant adoption of the broad
view of the targeting forum requirement.  When a defendant willfully targets
a known resident plaintiff it is not merely foreseeable that the plaintiff will 
be injured in that state, but the defendant, in a very real sense, has
purposefully directed his actions to cause injury in that state.  The plaintiff 
can be expected to sue in the state in which she resides and the injury
occurred; and the state has a very strong regulatory interest in protecting
its residents from willfully caused injury within its borders.187  It is  
therefore foreseeable that the defendant might be haled into court in that 
state.188  Moreover, in the case of willful misconduct, it is very easy to
structure one’s activities to avoid suit in the chosen forum.189  Simply do 
not engage in conduct you know or should know violates the law. Finally, 
in no sense can it be said that suit was the result of the defendant’s
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” with the forum state.190 The
defendant purposefully chose to cause the plaintiff injury in the forum 
state.
Policy considerations also warrant adoption of the broad view of the 
targeting forum requirement when the defendant has willfully injured the 
plaintiff.  The two policies traditionally identified to support the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction doctrine are avoiding state overreaching191 and 
186. See supra notes 16–34 and accompanying text. 
187. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984); Brennan v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse N.Y., Inc., 322 F. App’x 852, 857 (11th Cir. 2009); 
D’Onofrio v. Il Mattino, 430 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
188. Cf. Brennan, 322 F. App’x at 855–56 (“Where a forum seeks to assert specific 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, due process requires that the defendant 
have ‘fair warning’ that a particular activity may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign 
sovereign. ‘This “fair warning” requirement is satisfied if the defendant has “purposefully
directed” his activities at residents of the forum . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
189. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
190. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. 
at 475). 
191. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (explaining personal jurisdiction 
requirements “act to ensure States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits 
imposed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal system.”). The Court 
has subsequently said that the state overreaching concern (sometimes labeled a federalism 
interest) “must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved 
 381
GOLDMAN FINAL FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2018 4:32 PM        
 
 








   
 
 





   
  
 
   
 
  
    
 




   
   
   
 
     
  
 
fairness to the defendant.192 The forum state has a strong regulatory interest 
in preventing injury to residents from intentional misconduct,193 and no
state has an interest in encouraging willful misconduct.  Therefore the 
plaintiff’s home state would not be overreaching or encroaching upon 
other states’ regulatory interests when it requires the defendant to answer
for the actions that caused willful injury within the state.194  It is also not
unfair to the defendant to ask him to defend in the forum in which he 
purposefully targets and injures a plaintiff.  Common sense dictates as
much.  The defendant has “fair warning”195 of the possibility of suit in that
forum and can easily avoid suit there by not willfully causing injury to a 
known forum resident.  Remember too, even if willfulness justifies a court
finding purposeful direction under the broad view of Calder, the defendant
might still avoid litigating in the challenged forum if proceeding there 
would actually hamper her defense.196  Significant inconvenience also
could justify the court transferring venue to a more convenient forum.197 
Moreover, in today’s world of modern transportation and communication,
objections to personal jurisdiction are rarely motivated by the defendant’s
actual ability to defend or fairness concerns.  Rather, motions to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction typically are strategic motions seeking to
by the Due Process Clause rather than as a function of federalism concerns.” Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 472 n.13; McMunigal, supra note 185, at 211. 
192. See Int’l. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (explaining due process 
requires certain minimum contacts “so as not to offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice”); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating personal jurisdiction
requirements are designed, in part, to protect “the defendant against the burdens of 
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.”). 
193. See supra note 187. 
194. See Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process 
Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 425–26 (2004); see
also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984). 
195. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472. 
196. If purposeful direction is found, the defendant still has the opportunity to
demonstrate that litigation in the chosen forum would be unfair or unreasonable. See
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476–77; Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th
Cir. 2011); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 2010); Chaiken v. VV Publ’g 
Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997).  However, plaintiffs have a legitimate interest 
in suing in their home state, and the forum has a strong interest in protecting its residents 
from intentional injury. See Keeton, 471 U.S. at 776.  Thus, it would require an unusual 
fact pattern for a defendant to be able to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that 
jurisdiction would be unreasonable when the defendant willfully injures the plaintiff in the 
forum state. See Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010­
Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, at ¶ 72 (“The United States Supreme Court has indicated that 
a high degree of unfairness is required to erect a constitutional barrier to jurisdiction. * * *
This is especially true in a case (such as the one herein) in which the defendant has
intentionally directed his activity at forum residents * * * and the “effects” of the activity 
occur in the forum state.’” (citations omitted)).
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
382
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shift the costs of travel from the defendant to the plaintiff.  Not only may
costs of travel be significant in absolute terms, they also can have substantial 
effect on the terms of any settlement agreement.  Simple justice dictates 
that travel costs should be borne by the intentional wrongdoer rather than
the innocent victim. Obviously, imposing the travel costs on the defendant 
will also help deter willful misconduct.  Additionally, if plaintiffs have to 
travel, they may effectively be deprived of access to the courts. Regulatory 
interests may suffer from under-enforcement as a result.198  In brief,
individual-focused corrective justice interests and societal interests in
general deterrence and efficient enforcement199 also support placing the
costs of travel on the defendant in the case of willful misconduct.200
 198. See Robertson, supra note 35, at 1301, 1346 nn.236–37, (citing Megan M. La 
Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 43, 62 (2010)) (unavailability of the home forum, “causes alleged [patent] infringers 
to forego declaratory relief and allows many bad patents to go unchallenged.”). 
199. Individual corrective justice interests and future focused societal interests
correspond to what one commentator has labeled desert and utility principles—ideologies
that, he argues, motivate much of criminal and tort law and underlie the factors in the
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  See McMunigal, supra note 185, at 
199–209.  Desert principles use both moral criteria and a retrospective perspective to
achieve what is just and to prevent what is unjust. Id. at 199–200.  Utility theory “focuses
on the interests of society rather than on the rights or responsibilities of individuals” and
uses instrumental norms such as deterrence or cost-spreading rather than moral criteria. 
Id. at 200. 
200. One might suggest that these same principles and arguments could support a 
suit in any jurisdiction, whether or not the plaintiff resides in that forum.  That is, where 
the defendant engages in willful misconduct, he is a bad guy and should not be heard to 
complain about any inconvenience.  Rather, he should be punished and thereby deterred 
from engaging in similar conduct in the future.  Such an argument would not be valid. 
First, it is clearly inconsistent with existing law.  Finding jurisdiction in any and all forums 
would violate Walden’s requirement that the defendant have some contact with the forum 
and also be irreconcilable with Walden’s apparent desire to limit the number of forums in
which a defendant can be sued.  See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122, 1125 (2014). 
There also would be no reasonable basis for saying that the defendant targeted the chosen 
forum as required by Calder. See supra notes 7, 51 and accompanying text. Second, 
policy interests are different when suit is in a random forum as opposed to the plaintiff’s 
home state.  When the defendant has no connection to the forum, the randomly chosen
forum, by upholding jurisdiction, would be guilty of violating its obligation to other states 
as co-equal sovereigns in the federal system. Therefore the state would be overreaching.
Although subjecting a defendant guilty of willful misconduct to jurisdiction in any state 
might increase deterrence, it would sacrifice efficiency, which is also an important interest
under utility theory.  See McMunigal, supra note 185, at 207.  Not only would the defendant
have to travel, but the plaintiff and witnesses also would likely have to travel.  This would
result in an increase, not a mere shifting of, travel costs.  The randomly chosen forum also 
would probably have to apply the law of the state in which the injury occurred. See 
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3. 	Reasons to Reject the Broad View of Calder’s “Targeting Forum” 
Requirement in the Absence of Willfulness 
Just as the presence of willfulness justifies following the broad view of 
Calder, the absence of willfulness warrants rejection of that view. When 
willfulness is lacking, unless additional facts supporting jurisdiction exist,
it can no longer be said that the defendant purposefully directed his actions 
at the forum state.  Similarly, where the defendant does not willfully violate
the law, he does not have “fair warning”201 that he will be subject to
jurisdiction in the chosen forum and cannot as easily structure his activities 
to avoid suit in that forum. For example, consider a defendant in a trademark
case, that knowing of the plaintiff’s mark, uses a similar but non-identical 
mark for non-competing goods.202  The defendant, assuming there could 
not be any confusion between the two marks, would not have fair warning 
that suit could occur in plaintiff’s home state and would not know to
structure its activities differently until it was too late. 
Policy interests also recommend rejection of the broad view when 
willfulness cannot be shown. In the absence of willful misconduct, the 
state’s interest in protecting its citizens is reduced and interference with
other states’ regulatory interests can increase.  For example, without 
willfulness, defamation actions in unexpected forums may chill valuable 
speech that many States, as well as society, would want to encourage.203 
Fearing suit in a distant forum, consumers may not share on the internet
their negative experiences with a disreputable seller and print media may
forego critical commentary of parties residing out of state.  Adopting the
broad view without imposing a willfulness requirement also could compromise 
important state and societal interests in economic competition.  For example, 
generic brands often copy the packaging of the leading brand and add
clear disclaimers to avoid consumer confusion.  Such packaging is not 
designed to confuse consumers, but to easily and cheaply inform them that
a less expensive substitute exists for the leading brand.  If those generic 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: PERSONAL INJURIES § 146 (1971). 
Obviously, the state where the injury occurred can more efficiently interpret and apply
their law.  Finally, remedies under the substantive law are designed to provide the optimal 
deterrence for any violation of the law.  Increasing the defendant’s travel costs as punishment, 
rather than in an effort to save the plaintiff additional expenses, could lead to undesirable 
and needless over-deterrence.  Quite simply, the arguments for adopting the broad view of
Calder in the case of willful misconduct do not similarly justify plaintiff suing in any
random forum. 
201. See supra notes 186, 195. 
202. See e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 
1026, 1027 (2d Cir. 1989), where a legal research company claimed that automaker’s 
“Lexus” brand diluted its “Lexis” trademark.
 203. See Stein, supra note 194, at 422. 
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brands could be sued in a distant forum merely because the leading brand 
resided there, they might be discouraged from using such informative
packaging or even from entering the market at all.  The result would be 
higher prices market-wide.
In the absence of willfulness, the defendant cannot be characterized as 
a bad guy, and therefore, there would be no reason to prefer plaintiff over 
the defendant in allocating travel costs.  In fact, in many cases, it might be 
the plaintiff who is the bad guy, using claims in far-off forums to harass 
the defendant.  Such plaintiffs could file weak or even frivolous suits and
a number of defendants might have to default rather than defend in the 
inconvenient forum.204  Permitting jurisdiction based upon effects in the
plaintiff’s home state, without demanding a showing of willfulness, would 
be so overbroad that plaintiffs might be able to file suit in their home state 
on almost any action.  A plaintiff could claim effects-based jurisdiction in 
their home state even in contract or negligence actions.205  Obviously, in
the absence of additional contacts between the defendant and the forum,
this would be contrary to existing case law, unfair to the defendant, and 
the antithesis of due process.206 
Thus, individual-focused corrective justice interests and societal interests 
in general deterrence and efficient enforcement favor rejecting the broad 
view of Calder when willfulness is absent. Rather, under the restrictive 
view of Calder or under non-effects-based personal jurisdiction principles, a
plaintiff should have to prove that the defendant directed her activities to
the forum itself to sustain personal jurisdiction. 
204. Of course, plaintiffs always may file non-meritorious suits in distant forums to
harass a defendant.  However, in most such cases the defendant can default and challenge 
the finding of jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks to enforce the judgment in the defendant’s
home state.  In the absence of a willfulness requirement, the broad view of Calder may
support the finding of jurisdiction in the original forum, and therefore the default judgment 
might be enforceable in other states, including defendant’s home state. 
205.  Such actions would literally fall within the oft-cited three-prong Calder effects
test. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  Even if one limited Calder to intentional
torts, as was the Court’s apparent intent, it would often be easy to allege an intentional tort
with effects in the state and justify jurisdiction in the non-intentional tort actions under the 
courts’ pendent personal jurisdiction powers. See supra note 51; Fiore v. Walden, 688 
F.3d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 2012); Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery Inc., 368 F.3d
1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). 
206. Cf. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (the “limits on the State’s 
adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the non-resident defendant—not 
the convenience of plaintiffs . . . .”). 
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4. The Standard of Review for Determining Willfulness 
This Article’s recommended focus on willfulness is easily justified. 
However determining willfulness at the pleading stage under the traditional 
prima facie standard of proof207 would prove problematic.  Accordingly,
this Article recommends adoption of a “likelihood of success” standard 
for determining willfulness on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. This section explains why the prima facie standard of proof 
should be rejected, provides legal support for the likelihood of success 
model, and responds to possible criticisms of that standard.
a. Why the Prima Facie Standard of Review Should Be Rejected 
The prima facie standard is inadequate for determining willfulness at
the pleading stage because in too many cases it is too easy to make a prima
case of willfulness, especially when plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 
true and all conflicts are resolved in plaintiff’s favor.208 The result would 
be to allow too many cases to go forward where willfulness was lacking.
This would create the same problems that result from adoption of the
broad view of Calder in the absence of willfulness.209  Despite the plaintiff’s
allegations, defendant may not truly have purposefully targeted the forum 
or known that he could be haled into court in the forum state.  The forum 
might not really have a strong interest in the litigation and adjudication in 
the chosen forum might infringe upon other state’s regulatory interests. 
Alleging that the defendant is a bad guy doesn’t make it so.  It is just as 
likely that the plaintiff’s claims cannot be proven or that the plaintiff is 
using suit in a forum unfavorable to the defendant as a tool for harassment. 
If a prima facie standard of proof is used at the pleading stage, plaintiff 
does ultimately have to prove willfulness by a preponderance of the 
evidence at trial.210  However, having to litigate a full trial in an inconvenient
forum to get a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction would make due
process rights largely illusory. 
The prima facie standard of proof on motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction derives, in part, from use of the identical standard on
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.211  However, there is reason 
207. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
208. See Stampone v. Fopma, No. 13-4436, 2014 WL 2024995, at *1 (3d Cir. May
19, 2014) (citing Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009)); 
Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010); Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 
846 (11th Cir. 2010); GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1020 n.1
(7th Cir. 2009).
209. See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 19. 
211. Robertson, supra note 35, at 1328. 
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to distinguish the two motions.  The standard of review under motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim is deferential to the plaintiff to protect
the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment rights.212  An erroneous dismissal on
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim results in res judicata and 
may violate the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.213  An erroneous denial of
the motion, on the other hand, does not violate any Constitutional right.214 
In contrast, personal jurisdiction is designed to protect the defendant’s due 
process rights under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, not any right 
of the plaintiff.215  An erroneous denial of the motion can infringe upon 
the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from litigation in a forum 
with which it does not have minimum contacts.216  An erroneous grant of
the motion, however, does not result in res judicata and does not violate 
any constitutional mandate. Thus, there is reason to adopt a less plaintiff-
deferential standard of review on motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
b. Support for the “Likelihood of Success” Standard 
The likelihood of success standard is such a less plaintiff-deferential 
standard that avoids the problems created by the prima facie standard.217 
Under the proposed standard, few cases will go forward where willfulness 
ultimately is found lacking.  The likelihood of success standard also has 
the advantage of familiarity as it is the standard routinely applied on
motions for a preliminary injunction.218 Courts have even required that
personal jurisdiction be established under that standard in cases where
preliminary relief is sought.219  Although in effect test cases the court will 
be forced to make preliminary judgments about the merits of the case 
under the likelihood of success standard, it is not unusual for courts to
make pre-trial decisions about the strength of a party’s case.  For example,
 212. Id. at 1329. 
213. Id. at 1329, 1330 n.159. 
214. Id. at 1330. 
215. Id. at 1329. 
216. See supra notes 20–22.
 217. See supra notes 208–216 and accompanying text. 
218. See Lam Yeen Leng v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd., 474 Fed. App’x 810, 813
(2d Cir. 2012); Enter. Int’l., Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 
464, 471 (5th Cir. 1985); Indus. Elecs. Corp. v. Cline, 330 F.2d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1964). 
219. See Visual Scis., Inc. v. Integrated Commc’ns, Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 
1981); Indus. Elecs. Corp., 330 F.2d at 482. 
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in criminal cases, courts necessarily consider the power of the government’s
case when determining whether to grant bail.220  Courts in England also
consider the merits of a party’s case to determine the propriety of service
on a defendant outside the jurisdiction under their “service out”
procedures.221 
The First Circuit has explicitly authorized lower courts to adopt the 
likelihood of success standard for motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction when, like in effects test cases, the facts required to decide 
personal jurisdiction overlap with those necessary to decide the merits of
the action.222  In Foster-Miller, Inc., the First Circuit found that the prima
facie standard was inadequate to screen cases with conflicting versions of 
the facts and could allow “a dubious case to proceed beyond the pleading
stage, and even to trial, though the court eventually will be found to lack
jurisdiction.”223  The court rejected the more rigorous preponderance 
standard, in part, because that standard requires a full-blown evidentiary 
hearing that can squander judicial resources.224  The court further reasoned 
that because the preponderance standard contemplates a binding adjudication, 
the court’s factual determinations ordinarily will have preclusive effect, and, thus, 
at least in situations in which the facts pertinent to jurisdiction and the facts
pertinent to the merits are identical, or nearly so . . . the preponderance method 
can all too easily verge on a deprivation of the right to trial by jury.225 
The court recommended the intermediate “likelihood” standard because 
that standard provided some “assurance that the circumstances justify
imposing on a foreign defendant the burdens of trial in a strange forum, 
but leaves to the time of trial a binding resolution of the factual disputes 
common to both the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the claim,”
thereby avoiding troublesome preclusion or law of the case issues.226 
At least in part because burden of proof issues are rarely litigated,227 
when personal jurisdiction questions overlap with the merits, other Circuit
 220. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012). 
221. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 516 & nn.110, 119 (2010); Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel:
The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
473, 491 & n.117. 
222. See Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir.
1995); Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 678 (1st Cir. 1992); Yordan v. Am. 
Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 293 F.R.D. 91, 94 (D.P.R. 2013). 
223.  46 F.3d at 146. 
224. Id.
 225. Id.
 226. Id. 
227. See Robertson, supra note 35, at 1327. 
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Courts of Appeals have neither explicitly rejected nor adopted the 
recommended standard.228 
Those circuits typically apply either the prima facie or preponderance 
standards. The former already has been shown to be an unsatisfactory 
standard for judging willfulness.  The preponderance standard, used when 
there is an evidentiary hearing,229 often produces the same result as the
likelihood of success standard.  In those cases where the results from the
two standards differ, the likelihood of success model appears to be the
preferable standard and adoption of that standard should be within the 
courts’ broad discretion.230 
When there is a full-blown hearing in a judge-tried case, there is no 
effective difference between the likelihood of success and preponderance 
standards. If the court finds that it is more likely than not that there is
jurisdiction, it would find a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff would
be able to succeed in proving personal jurisdiction. Conversely, if the 
court thinks jurisdiction is less likely than not, it would find that the
plaintiff does not have a reasonable probability of success in proving personal
jurisdiction. 
The two standards could produce different outcomes if the court, in a 
jury-tried case, believes there is not a preponderance of evidence establishing 
jurisdiction, but that a reasonable jury might evaluate the evidence differently. 
Judges normally determine factual issues on personal jurisdiction issues
and juries determine factual issues on the merits.  When the two issues
overlap, as in effects test cases, the likelihood of success test leaves the 
ultimate findings of fact to the jury.231  That approach seems to be most 
consistent with the Seventh Amendment and avoids any preclusion or law 
228. A district court in Maryland, however, has adopted the First Circuit approach. 
See Burns & Russell Co. of Baltimore v. Oldcastle Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (D. Md. 
2002).
229. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
230. District courts have broad discretion to decide both whether to hold a hearing
and to determine the nature of that hearing. See Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d
671, 676–78 (1st Cir. 1992); Visual Scis., Inc. v. Integrated Commc’ns, Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 
58 (2d Cir. 1981); Mach 1 Air Servs., Inc. v. Bustillos, No. CV-12-026160PHX-GMS,
2013 WL 1222567, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2013); Int’l Customs Assocs., Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 893 F. Supp. 1251, 1258–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) aff’d., 201 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 
1999).
231. Of course, decisions under the prima facie standard also leave the ultimate fact-
finding to the jury.  Thus, the law does not compel a court to make all factual findings on 
a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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of case issues.232  Accordingly, a district court should have the discretion
to adopt that standard.233 
When there is a preliminary, as opposed to a full-blown hearing, a court
might find that the plaintiff had not established jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence, but that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that they could after a more complete hearing on the issue.  However, if 
the court held that belief, it would make little sense to apply the
preponderance standard and dismiss the case.  Either the court should 
order discovery and hold a more complete evidentiary hearing234 or view
its decision as tentative with the final decision left to the jury.  The latter 
approach, which is essentially just application of the likelihood of success 
standard, would be consistent with courts’ treatment of factual findings
on a motion for a preliminary injunction,235 or on a motion to dismiss
under the prima facie standard.  Also, as the court in Foster-Miller, Inc., 
found,236 when the facts alleged to prove personal jurisdiction overlap 
with the facts necessary for liability, as they do in effects test cases,237 a 
dismissal after a full-blown hearing under the preponderance standard can 
either effectively deprive the plaintiff of the right to jury trial or be very
inefficient. If the factual findings of the first court are found to have 
preclusive effects in the forum that had proper jurisdiction, the defendant 
essentially would be deprived of her right to jury trial on the merits.  If the 
first court’s findings would not have preclusive effects, the parties and
court system would have to shoulder the costs of two full litigations of the 
same issues. Thus, holding a preliminary hearing and applying the 
recommended standard of proof is preferable to holding a full-blown 
hearing and applying the preponderance standard.  The result that is 
preferable should be within the sound discretion of the trial court even in 
jurisdictions that have not yet followed the First Circuit. 
In sum, application of the prima facie standard to determine willfulness 
would raise the same problems that are created by following the broad 
view of Calder without any showing of willfulness.  There is reason to 
question importing the prima facie standard from motions to dismiss for 
232. See supra note 230.
 233. Id.
 234. See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 637–38 (1st Cir.
2001). Courts have broad discretion to allow and manage jurisdictional discovery. See 
Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy, Inc., 490 Fed. Appx. 86, 104 (10th Cir. 2012); LaSala v.
Marfin Popular Bank Pub. Co., 410 Fed. App’x 474, 476 (3d Cir. 2011); Carefirst of Md., 
Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003). 
235. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); Jonibach Mgmt. Trust 
v. Wartburg Enters., Inc., 750 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2014). 
236. Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir. 1995). 
237. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786–787 (1984). 
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failure to state a claim to the personal jurisdiction area.  The likelihood of
success model avoids the problems created by the prima facie test, it has
some support in the case law, and is not too different from, but is preferable
to, the preponderance standard traditionally used when courts hold
evidentiary hearings. Lastly, because district courts have broad discretion 
to hold and manage evidentiary hearings, courts should have the power to
hold preliminary hearings and adopt the likelihood of success standard in 
jurisdictions that have not explicitly authorized application of that test. 
c. Responses to Criticisms of the “Likelihood of Success” Standard 
A number of criticisms can be or have been made about applying a
higher standard of review than the prima facie standard to jurisdictional 
issues.238  Most such criticisms are based upon a comparison to the
preponderance standard.239  The critics argue that use of the preponderance
standard can raise preclusion or law of the case issues or create an incentive 
to default so that the factual issues common to personal jurisdiction and 
the merits can be tried in a more convenient forum.240  These are not valid 
criticisms of an intermediate standard of review.  The likelihood of success 
standard is easier to meet than the preponderance standard so findings
under that standard could not be used to preclude litigation of facts on the
merits that are needed to be proved under the higher preponderance 
standard.241  Adoption of this Article’s recommendations would also leave
defendants with the incentive to try the merits in the original forum rather 
than default. By appearing, the defendant would have the opportunity to
contest plaintiff’s damage claims if the defendant lost on liability and 
virtually all plaintiffs would bring claims for damages, often including
punitive damages, in actions alleging willfulness. One possible criticism of
the likelihood of success model, however, does deserve greater discussion. 
238. See supra note 223. 
239. See Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680–81 (Ill. 1957); Kevin M. Clermont, 
Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 976–77 (2006).  A defendant is “always free 
to ignore . . . judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that 
judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.”  Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). 
240. See Nelson, 143 N.E.2d at 680–81; Clermont, supra note 239, at 976–77; Robertson, 
supra note 35, at 1337. 
241. See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2004); Littlejohn v. United 
States, 321 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2003); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4422 (4th ed. 2014). 
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A person unsympathetic to this Article’s recommendation can reasonably 
argue that the likelihood of success standard will impose greater discovery 
and hearing costs on the parties and the courts than are incurred under the
prima facie standard.242  Although there could be an increase in such costs,
the increase should not be as great as it first appears, particularly given 
this Article’s requirement of willfulness, and could be more than offset by
the costs of trials that would be avoided under the higher standard of 
review.
In many cases it will not be necessary to have discovery or a hearing to 
determine whether the plaintiff can show willfulness under the likelihood 
of success standard—it will be clear from the pleadings that the plaintiff 
will not be able to prove willfulness.  In cases in which liability is 
reasonably contested or doubtful, proving willful misconduct, as defined
by this Article,243 would be almost impossible.  For example, in a trademark 
infringement suit, if the defendant uses a non-identical mark on non-competing 
goods, a court, without ordering discovery or conducting a hearing, can 
easily find an absence of willfulness.  In other cases, the plaintiff will not 
even allege willfulness or will be unable to do so with the factual specificity 
required by Twombley244 and Iqbal.245 Conversely, in some cases, such as
in the identity theft situation described in the introduction or in counterfeiting 
cases, the defendant will not be able to deny willfulness.
Even if discovery is ordered under the likelihood of success model, 
there is no guarantee that it wouldn’t be ordered under any standard of 
proof. Courts have broad discretion to order discovery under the prima 
facie standard as well.246  For that matter, this Article’s recommended
requirement of willfulness may actually reduce the number of cases in
which the court needs to order discovery or conduct evidentiary hearings 
regardless of the standard of proof the court applies.  As suggested above, 
there will be many cases where it will be clear from the pleadings that 
willfulness is lacking. 
If the higher standard of proof required more discovery and evidentiary
hearings, the percentage of cases in which there would be an increase
242. The additional discovery costs may be of particular concern because jurisdictional
discovery costs tend to be imposed asymmetrically. See Strong, supra note 221, at 539 & 
n.44. It is the defendant’s contacts with the forum that is most relevant to personal 
jurisdiction issues and evidence of such contacts will be almost exclusively in the hands
of the defendant. 
243. See supra notes 175–84 and accompanying text. 
244.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). 
245.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
246. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 & n.13 (1978); Me. 
Med. Ctr. v. United States, 675 F.3d 110, 118–19 (1st Cir. 2012); Edmond v. U.S. Postal 
Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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would be very small, if only because there are relatively few cases in 
which the plaintiff argues that the Calder effects test supports jurisdiction. 
The court also has the power to limit discovery under the federal rules247 
and can sanction frivolous allegations of willfulness.248  Moreover, the
recommended higher standard of proof would result in more dismissals 
for lack of personal jurisdiction thereby offsetting, at least in part, the 
additional pre-trial costs by the costs saved by avoiding unnecessary
trials.249 
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the First Circuit has authorized
application of the recommended intermediate standard of proof and there 
is no evidence that this has resulted in any significant increase in discovery 
or hearing costs in that circuit. Thus, although the effects of adoption of 
this Article’s proposals on discovery and hearing costs may be a reasonable
concern, there are many reasons to believe that in reality total costs of litigation 
will increase negligibly, if at all, under the recommended approach. 
Although this section has explained why a finding of willful misconduct
should be the central focus of Calder’s effects test and justified the 
likelihood of success standard of proof to determine that fact, it is still
necessary to briefly address the remaining requirement of this Article’s
proposed approach to Calder. 
B. 	The Defendant Knew Plaintiff’s Primary Residence and That the 
Plaintiff Would Be Proximately Harmed In That State
This last requirement closely tracks existing case law,250 but makes 
explicit that the effects test should provide jurisdiction only when both the 
defendant knew of plaintiff’s primary state of residence and the harm
from the defendant’s willful misconduct proximately resulted in that state. 
247. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
248. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
249.  Costs would be avoided in cases in which the court found a prima facie case of
jurisdiction and the jury determines that the plaintiff has not shown jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence. Presumably, if the defendants won on the merits, they
would waive the personal jurisdiction challenge.  However, if the plaintiff won in a case 
where the jury found liability, but not willfulness, the trial would have been for naught. 
250. See supra notes 7, 51 and accompanying text. 
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1. Primary Residence 
In many cases, a plaintiff may be said to reside in multiple locations. 
For example, an individual may have a summer and winter home and a 
corporation can have multiple plants.  Limiting application of the effects 
test to the plaintiff’s primary residence provides predictability and is 
consistent with Walden’s desire to limit the number of forums that can
have personal jurisdiction under Calder.251  Unless the defendant has
knowledge of the plaintiff’s primary residence, it could not foresee being 
haled into court there and could not be said to target that forum.
This Article would define the primary residence of an individual to be 
the place where that person currently lives and is expected to remain for 
the period of time in which suit normally would be brought. This definition 
ensures that the defendant could foresee being haled into court in the state
of plaintiff’s primary residence.  Although there will be some difficult line 
drawing as to what is a sufficient length of time to satisfy this definition, 
it is clear that a short vacation does not252 and a period of time longer than
the statute of limitations for the action does. 
The primary residence of a corporation should be considered its
headquarters. That is the single location that a defendant generally would 
most expect to be haled into court.  When a corporation’s headquarters and
principle place of business are in different states, if the defendant harmed
the plaintiff in the state in which the principle place of business was 
located, suit could likely be brought in that state under traditional personal 
jurisdiction principles, but not under the “effects test.”
2. Proximate Harm in the Plaintiff’s Primary Residence 
For the purposes of this Article, the state(s) in which a plaintiff is
proximately harmed is the one(s) in which the plaintiff first experiences
direct harm from the defendant’s willful misconduct.  This requires that 
the actual tort or injury, not just its consequences, occur in the state.253 
When there is direct harm in the state of plaintiff’s primary residence the 
defendant should be able to foresee suit in that state and the defendant, in 
contrast to Walden, can be said to have contacts with that forum.254 The
 251. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). 
252. A person on vacation should not even be considered to “live” in the state in
which they are vacationing. Of course, a vacationing plaintiff still might be able to sue in 
the state in which they were injured under traditional personal jurisdiction principles. 
253. See Precision IBC, Inc. v. Wagner Ink, Inc., No. CA 1:12-00671-C, 2013 WL 
1728563, at *12 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 22, 2013). 
254. See supra notes 145–47, 160–66, and accompanying text.  If direct harm did 
not constitute a contact, then when (1) the defendant put a bomb on an airline going to
California; (2) the flight was rerouted to Texas due to bad weather; and (3) the bomb
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same cannot be said, absent additional contacts, in the absence of direct 
harm. 
In many cases, the plaintiff first experiences harm from the defendant’s
misconduct in a multitude of states.  For example, a deliberately false 
statement about Sears published in a national publication would be first 
experienced simultaneously in every state.  In such circumstances, Sears
should be considered to be proximately harmed in every state.  Similarly,
a trademark violation would cause direct harm to the mark holder in every
state in which the infringing mark created a likelihood of confusion.255 
Nonetheless, in such cases, the effects test could only support personal 
jurisdiction in the state of plaintiff’s primary residence.256 
This definition of proximate harm eliminates use of the effects test in
cases where the plaintiff is directly harmed in a non-primary place of
residence and only indirect harm occurs in the primary place of residence.
For example, if an Arizona corporation sues a Texas corporation for inducing 
an employee at the plaintiff’s Texas plant to breach their employment
contract and join the defendant’s Texas operations, suit in Arizona would 
not be proper under this Article’s proposed test absent additional contacts. 
Under such circumstances, the defendant would expect to be sued in Texas,
it would be difficult to say that in any meaningful sense that the defendant 
targeted Arizona, and the convenience of the witnesses and parties would 
seem to favor Texas.257 
The requirement of proximate harm in the plaintiff’s primary residence 
will also exclude use of effects test jurisdiction in cases where a person is 
harmed in a face-to-face transaction outside the state of the plaintiff’s 
primary residence.  This would be true even if indirect harm ultimately
occurs in the plaintiff’s home state.  For example, if a Mississippi resident 
travels to New York and is defrauded by a New York seller, the facts that
the seller knows plaintiff is from Mississippi and her bank balance in
Mississippi will be wiped out does not justify suit in Mississippi.  Under 
such circumstances, it is not reasonable to say that the cause of action 
exploded on the runway at the Texas airport causing injuries to Texas workers, the workers
would not be able to sue the defendant in Texas. That result seems unacceptable.
255. In jurisdictions that find that a trademark violation occurs wherever the mark
holder resides, the plaintiff also would be proximately harmed in that state. See supra note
164 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra § VI(B)(1). 
257. But see Mach 1 Air Servs., Inc. v. Bustillos, No. CV-12-026160PHX-GMS,
2013 WL 1222567, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2013) (finding jurisdiction proper under 
identical facts).
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arose in Mississippi or that the defendant directed her action to that state.
Also requiring suit to be in New York does not unfairly impose travel 
costs on the plaintiff based upon circumstances outside their control. 
Plaintiff should know that traveling to New York could result in a suit 
there and it is within plaintiff’s power to avoid suit by not traveling to 
New York. Compare Shirley Jones’ situation in the Calder case. If suit
had to be in Florida, Ms. Jones couldn’t have done anything to avoid suit 
there. There would seem to be no basis for imposing travel costs on such 
a plaintiff other than to favor the defendant, which, in the case of a
defendant who is likely to have engaged in willful misconduct, does not 
seem fair.  Finally, the state where the face-to-face transaction occurred
has the greatest interest in regulating that transaction and is in the best 
position to apply its law. 
Thus, this Article’s requirement that the defendant’s willful misconduct
proximately harms the plaintiff in the state of its primary residence 
ensures that: (1) the defendant can both foresee being sued in that state 
and be said to have contacts with that state; (2) the defendant truly targeted
that state; (3) suit cannot be brought in more than one state under the 
effects test; and (4) travel costs are allocated fairly, not simply as a form
of punishment. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In Walden v. Fiore, the Court granted certiorari ostensibly to resolve
the split among Circuit Courts of Appeals about the proper interpretation 
of Calder’s “effects test.”  Unfortunately, the case was not a good vehicle
to do so because jurisdiction should have been found lacking under any 
view of Calder.  For that reason, as well as because the opinion contains 
both express limitations on its scope and language that can be used to 
distinguish Walden, the decision should have limited significance.  To fill
the void left by the Walden opinion, this Article has presented a recommended 
approach to Calder that to a large extent harmonizes the conflicting lower
court decisions, best furthers sound policy and is generally consistent with
existing case law. The suggested approach focuses on whether the 
defendant’s alleged misconduct was willful or in bad faith.  Where willfulness 
can be shown under a likelihood of success standard, the defendant should
be considered to have targeted the forum state when the defendant knew 
that plaintiff’s primary residence was in that state and plaintiff was proximately
harmed in that state.  When defendants have engaged in willful misconduct,
they should foresee being haled into court in the plaintiff’s home state and
can structure their relationships to avoid suit there.  Fairness also dictates
that travel costs be imposed on the willful violator of the law, rather than 
the innocent victim of their misconduct. 
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On the other hand, when willfulness is absent, the opposite is true.
Absent additional facts, the defendant may neither foresee being haled
into court in the plaintiff’s home state nor have the ability to structure its 
relationships to avoid suit there.  When willfulness is lacking, there also 
is no reason to prefer the plaintiff over the defendant in allocating travel 
costs. Rather, under traditional personal jurisdiction principles that focus 
on the rights of the defendant, the plaintiff should be required to bear the 
costs of travel unless it could show that the defendant targeted the forum 
state, not merely a plaintiff residing there. 
This Article recommends that on a motion to dismiss willfulness should 
be determined under the likelihood of success standard applied in preliminary
injunction actions, rather than the prima facie or preponderance standards.
In effects test cases, where jurisdiction facts overlap with the facts necessary 
to determine the merits, the likelihood of success standard prevents cases
with dubious allegations of willfulness from proceeding to trial and thereby 
interfering with defendant’s due process rights—as can happen under the
prima facie standard—yet avoids significant inefficiencies or troubling 
law of the case or preclusion issues that may effectively deprive a party
of its right to a jury trial, which can occur under the preponderance standard.
Under this Article’s recommended approach, Samantha Smith would not
have to travel to Ohio to sue John Jones in the identity theft hypothetical 
described in the Introduction.  That is how it should be. 
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